1. An Essay on Crimes and Punishments

Cesare Beccaria

Beccaria's book, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, presents the first of the modern or scientific theories of crime. The book, first published in 1764, became the foundation for the classical theory of criminology, which dominated explanations of crime for close to 100 years. According to classical theory, people are rational and concerned with minimizing their pain and maximizing their pleasure. Their efforts to do so often lead them to engage in crime, unless they are deterred by the threat of punishment.

Beccaria's book is primarily concerned with criticizing the legal system in the 1700s and offering proposals for its reform, but he presents the classical theory of crime in the process. Beccaria draws heavily on Thomas Hobbes's theory of society in critiquing the legal system, and his book opens with a brief summary of that theory, reprinted in the opening paragraph here. Hobbes noted that the pursuit of self-interest often leads people to harm one another and that individuals must give up some of their liberty for the sake of "peace and security." In particular, they form nations and such nations establish laws and administer punishments to deter people from harming one another in their pursuit of their interests or "passions." However, to be effective, punishments must meet certain conditions. Beccaria describes the characteristics of effective punishments in the remainder of this selection, noting that such punishments should be set by the "sovereign" or representative of the state (not decided by judges), clearly stated, proportionate to the crime, swift, and certain (for an overview of Beccaria's work, see Carpenter, 2010; see also Sweet and Groarke, 2010, on Jeremy Bentham, another major figure in the classical school).

Beccaria's theory is reflected in modern deterrence theories, which focus on the impact of official punishments on crime. Such theories and the evidence on their validity are discussed in Part XI. Briefly, some evidence shows that the certainty of punishment influences the likelihood of crime, but it is probably not among the most important causes of crime. The swiftness of punishment appears to have little impact on crime. Not much research has been done on the other characteristics of punishment listed by Beccaria, primarily because they are difficult to measure with existing data.

References


Of the Origin of Punishment

*Laws* are the conditions, under which men, naturally independent, united themselves in society. Weary of living in a continual state of war, and of enjoying a liberty which became of little value, from the uncertainty of its duration, they sacrificed one part of it, to enjoy the rest in peace and security. The sum of all these portions of the liberty of each individual constituted the sovereignty of a nation; and was deposited in the hands of the sovereign, as the lawful administrator. But it was not sufficient only to establish this deposit; it was also necessary to defend it from the usurpation of each individual, who will always endeavour to take away from the mass, not only his own portion, but to encroach on that of others. Some motives, therefore, that strike the senses, were necessary to prevent the despotism of each individual from plunging society into its former chaos. Such motives are the punishments established against the infractors of the laws. I say, that motives of this kind are necessary; because, experience shows, that the multitude adopt no established principle of conduct; and because, society is prevented from approaching to that dissolution, (to which, as well as all other parts of the physical, and moral world, it naturally tends) only by motives, that are the immediate objects of sense, and which being continually presented to the mind, are sufficient to counterbalance the effects of the passions of the individual, which oppose the general good. Neither the power of eloquence, nor the sublimest truths, are sufficient to restrain, for any length of time, those passions, which are excited by the lively impressions of present objects.

Of the Interpretation of Laws

*Judges*, in criminal cases, have no right to interpret the penal laws, because they are not legislators. The laws receive their force and authority from an oath of fidelity, either tacit, or expressed, which living subjects have sworn to their sovereign, in order to restrain the intestine fermentation of the private interests of individuals. From hence springs their true and natural authority. Who then is their lawful interpreter? The sovereign, that is, the representative of society, and not the judge, whose office is only to examine, if a man have, or have not committed an action contrary to the laws.

Of the Obscurity of Laws

*If* the power of interpreting laws be an evil, obscurity in them must be another. Crimes will be less frequent, in proportion as the code of laws is more universally read and understood: for there is no doubt, but that the eloquence of the passions is greatly assisted by ignorance, and uncertainty of punishments.

Of the Proportion Between Crimes and Punishments

... *It* is not only the common interest of mankind, that crimes should not be committed, but that crimes of every kind should be less frequent, in proportion to the evil they produce to society. Therefore, the means made use of by the legislature to prevent crimes, should be more powerful, in proportion as they are destructive of the public safety and happiness, and as the inducements to commit them are stronger. Therefore there ought to be a fixed proportion between crimes and punishments.

It is impossible to prevent entirely all the disorders which the passions of mankind cause in society. These disorders increase in proportion to the number of people, and the opposition of private interests. That force, which continually impels us to our private interest, like gravity, acts incessantly, unless it meets with an obstacle to oppose it. Punishments, which I would call political obstacles prevent the fatal effects of private interests.
Of the Intent of Punishments

The end of punishment... is no other, than to prevent the criminal from doing further injury to society, and to prevent others from committing the like offence. Such punishments, therefore, and such a mode of inflicting them, ought to be chosen, as will make the strongest and most lasting impressions on the minds of others, with the least torment to the body of the criminal....

Of the Advantage of Immediate Punishment

The more immediately after the commission of a crime a punishment is inflicted, the more just and useful it will be.... The degree of the punishment, and the consequences of a crime, ought be so contrived, as to have the greatest possible effect on others, with the least possible pain to the delinquent. If there be any society in which this is not a fundamental principle, it is an unlawful society; for mankind, by their union, originally intended to subject themselves to the least evils possible.

An immediate punishment is more useful; because the smaller the interval of time between the punishment and the crime, the stronger and more lasting will be the association of the two ideas of Crime and Punishment; so that they may be considered, one as the cause, and other as the unavoidable and necessary effect. It is demonstrated, that the association of ideas is the cement which unites the fabric of the human intellect; without which, pleasure and pain would be simple and ineffectual sensations....

It is, then, of the greatest importance, that the punishment should succeed the crime as immediately as possible, if we intend, that in the rude minds of the multitude, the seducing picture of the advantage arising from the crime, should instantly awake the attendant idea of punishment. Delaying the punishment serves only to separate these two ideas...

Of the Mildness of Punishments

Crimes are more effectually prevented by the certainty, than the severity of punishment.... The certainty of a small punishment will make a stronger impression, than the fear of one more severe, if attended with the hopes of escaping; for it is the nature of mankind to be terrified at the approach of the smallest inevitable evil, whilst hope, the best gift of heaven, hath the power of dispelling the apprehension of a greater; especially if supported by examples of impunity, which weakness or avarice too frequently afford....

That a punishment may produce the effect required, it is sufficient that the evil it occasions should exceed the good expected from the crime; including in the calculation the certainty of the punishment, and the privation of the expected advantage. All severity beyond this is superfluous, and therefore tyrannical....

Conclusion

From what I have written results the following general theorem....

That a punishment may not be an act of violence, of one, or of many against a private member of society, it should be public, immediate and necessary; the least possible in the case given; proportioned to the crime, and determined by the laws.

Discussion Questions

1. According to Beccaria, why is it necessary for the state to sometimes punish people?

2. Beccaria assumes that offenders are rational individuals pursuing their self-interest. Do you think this is an accurate view of all or most offenders?
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3. Do you think Beccaria would favor the death penalty? Why or why not? (He discusses this issue in some detail in his Essay on Crimes and Punishments.)

4. Evaluate our current system of punishing offenders using the criteria for effective punishments listed by Beccaria. In particular, do we satisfy the criteria listed by Beccaria?

5. Beccaria states that the “end of punishment is no other than to prevent the criminal from doing further injury to society.” Do you agree or do you feel that there are other purposes for punishment? Defend your answer.